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Academics, global leaders, and practitioners have debated, for 
decades, over the best management models (public, private, 
decentralized) of water utilities for increasing water access.   Proponents 
of privatized water utilities argue profit motive incentivizes efficiency 
leading cost saving, infrastructure improvements, and increase usage.  
Proponents of publicly owned water utilities argue that efficiency is 
improved do to accountably to a constituency.  Proponents of 
decentralized utilities argue locally owned water utilities maximize 
resource efficiency and eliminate waste because of accountability and 
local knowledge.    
This thesis investigated whether these debates over the best 
management model for increasing accessibility oversimplify a complex 
global development issue. To investigate the impact of management 
models of water utilities had on water coverage this thesis used 
statistical analysis coupled with three water utility case studies (Aguas 
Argentina (AASA) in Argentina, Companhia de Saneamento Basico do 
Estado de São Paulo (SABESP) in Brazil, Cooperativa de Servicios 
Públicos Santa Cruz (SAGUAPAC) in Bolivia).  Statistical analysis did not 
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identify a satisfactory relationship between management models and 
water coverage.  Additionally, case studies showed nuanced factors 
external to management models significantly impacted a utility’s water 
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 In 2000, Cochabamba, Bolivia privatized its municipal water utility 
resulting in massive protests and push back by the city’s residents.  
Typically referred to as the ‘Cochabamba Water Wars’, the episode 
epitomizes a decades long debate about the impact of management 
models of water utilities on water access.  Various international 
governmental and nongovernmental agencies estimate that anywhere 
from 880 million to 1.1 billion people lack adequate drinking water 
access.1  Academics, global leaders, and practitioners have debated, for 
decades, the best ways to increase access.  Pro-market donor 
organizations, like the World Bank, have commonly argued that privately 
operated water utilities position water as an economic good rather than 
a public good.  This commoditization can discourage over consumption 
and waste while generating much needed revenue for the infrastructure 
                                                 
1 The term ‘adequate drinking water access’, as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO), 
refers to “the improved service of piped water delivery provided by water utilities.”  Water access is 
defined broadly by the WHO as, “the availability of at least 20 liters per person per day from an 
‘improved source’ within 1 kilometer of the users dwelling.”  The term ‘improved source’ is further 
defined as, “types of technology and levels of service that are more likely to provide safe water, such 
as household connections, public standpipes, protected wells.”  Service delivery is a broad concept as 
well, which could include delivery by bottled water or truck.  Typically water utilities are integrated 
systems consisting of water treatment plants and delivery infrastructure (i.e. piping and 
infrastructure) responsible for accessing, filtering, sanitizing and delivering fresh drinking.  This thesis 
will focus on piped water delivery provided by water utilities. 
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improvements of water utilities.  Improvements to infrastructure can 
increase access by lowering the cost of piped water delivery.  In 
opposition, it has been argued that water access is a universal right, a 
natural monopoly, and cannot be commoditized.  Furthermore, 
privatization will increase the cost of water access leading increased 
access challenges for impoverished communities.  Therefore, ownership 
of water utilities should remain in the public sphere.   
This thesis investigated whether these debates over the best 
ownership model for increasing accessibility oversimplify a complex 
global development issue.  This thesis used statistical analysis coupled 
with case studies to investigate the impact management models of 
water utilities in developing countries2 had on water coverage.  A 
statistical analysis of 144 water utilities in 33 different countries did not 
establish a satisfactory level of significance between management 
models and water coverage.  Case studies of a privately owned water 
utility in Argentina, a publically owned water utility in Brazil, and a water 
                                                 
2 The World Bank, “Data - Country Classification.”; defines developing as, “countries with GNI per 
capita measurement of less than $11,905.” Countries with a GNI score below $976 as low income, 
$976 to $3,855 lower middle income, and $3,855 to $11,905 as upper middle income. 
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cooperative in Bolivia showed that factors external to ownership 
significantly impacted water coverage.   
   Discussed in the Literature Review Section, proponents of each 
ownership model commonly claim that their model increases water 
coverage through efficiency improvements.  Proponents of privatized 
water utilities argue that commodification of water creates profit motive 
that incentivizes efficiency.  Proponents of publicly owned water utilities 
argue that efficiency is improved because utility managers are 
accountable to a constituency.  Proponents of decentralized water 
utilities argue that locally owned water utilities are more suited to 
maximize resource efficiency and eliminate waste because of 
accountability and local knowledge.  After reviewing the literature 
covering management models this thesis started from the assumption 
that management models do impact water coverage.   
A regression model was used to identify statistical relationships 
between the water coverage of water utilities (categorized as public, 
private, or decentralized enterprise) and three independent variables 
that measure a utility’s efficiency.  The regression model used water 
utility performance data collected from the International Benchmarking 
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Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities (IBNET)3 program.  The 
dependent variable was IBNET’s indicator ‘water coverage’ defined as 
“the percentage of population with access to water services as a 
percentage of the total population under utility’s nominal 
responsibility.”4  The collected independent variables were: water 
production,5 non-revenue water,6 and unit operational cost.7  Regression 
analysis measured the relationship between the water coverage of 
categorized water utilities and their levels of water production, non-
revenue water, and unit operational cost.  
 To test the assumption that management models impact water 
coverage through efficiency regression analysis would need to establish 
a relationship between at least one ownership model’s (private, public, 
or decentralized ) water coverage and all three independent variables- 
water production, non-revenue water, and unit operational cost.  This 
                                                 
3 IBNET is a non-governmental organization that is funded by United Kingdom’s Department for 
International Development, The World Bank, and The United Nations Water and Water and Sanitation 
Program.  IBNET collects water and sanitation utility performance data and creates a benchmarking 
program that allows participating utilities access to comparative information. 
4 “IBNET Indicators,” 2. 
5 Ibid., 3. Water Production is defined as, “litres/person/day; total annual water sold expressed by 
populations served per day. 
6 Ibid., 5.  Non-revenue water is the “difference between water supplied and water sold (i.e. volume 
of water lost) expressed as a percentage of net water supplied. 
7 Ibid., 8.  Unit operational water cost is the “annual water service operational expense/total annual 
volume sold.” 
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thesis hypothesized that all three management models will show 
relationships between water coverage and the three independent 
variables.   
 Regression analysis showed statistically significant relationships 
between each ownership model’s water coverage and the independent 
variables.  Both publicly and privately owned water utilities had inverse 
relationship between water coverage and non-revenue water.  
Decentralized water utilities had a statistically significant relationship 
between water coverage and unit operational cost.  Regression analysis 
showed that perhaps there is a weak relationship between ownership 
model, water coverage, and efficiency.   
 This thesis analyzed one case study from each categorized 
ownership model to identify the positive and negative factors that 
impact the performance of water utilities. Kate Bayliss, from the 
University of Greenwich, has argued, “the nature of ownership does not 
necessarily indicate how an enterprise will perform.”8  For Bayliss, 
pricing, utility history, cost recovery, and the political environment 
influence utility performance.  This thesis’ three case studies concur with 
                                                 
8 Bayliss, “Utility Privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 529. 
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Bayliss’ conclusion by showing that factors external to management 
models impacted water coverage.   
For the privately owned case study this thesis looked at Aguas 
Argentina (AASA) a privatized water utility operating in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina.  AASA was awarded a 30 year concession contract but failed 
to meet contracted performance targets for expanding water coverage.  
Reviewed literature showed a rushed privatization process established 
institutions that failed to mediate the unique challenges created by local 
historical, political, geographic, and economic factors. 
 For the publicly owned case study this thesis looked at the 
Brazilian water and sanitation utility the Companhia de Saneamento 
Basico do Estado de São Paulo (SABESP) a public corporation primarily 
owned by the state of São Paulo.  This case study found that the rise of 
democracy in Brazil played a significant role in SABESP’s success in 
expanding water coverage. 
 For the decentralized case study this thesis looked at the 
Cooperativa de Servicios Públicos Santa Cruz (SAGUAPAC), a water and 
sewage utility serving the city of Santa Cruz de La Sierra, Bolivia.  The 
wealth of SAGUAPAC’s service area coupled with World Bank loans 
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played a significant role in the Bolivian utility’s successful expansion of 
water coverage.    
 Highlighted earlier, the Cochabamba Water Wars emphasizes the 
importance of this research.  Water availability is not just a business 
need or an economic need- it is needed for human existence.  
Distributions in access can lead to violent reactions as demonstrated in 
Cochabamba.  The next section reviews the literature on type of water 
coverage and production for this basic life necessity.  Poor water access 
is often associated with poverty.  For impoverished municipalities, 
states, and countries with limited resources and alternatives a better 
understanding of water delivery mechanism can be critical.  The findings 
from this research contribute to the understanding that management 
models alone do not positively or negatively impact water access.  More 
nuanced factors like a region’s laws, geography, history, and economics 






 While the management models have been separated into three 
different categories it could be argued that these categories themselves 
are oversimplified.  Within each category- private, public, and 
decentralized- there is variance in governance and legal structures.  This 
Literature Review section begins with an overview of each ownership 
model and their various structures.  Following, will be an examination of 
the various arguments surrounding water ownership.      
 
Types of Management models 
 
 For the most part water ownership and delivery was the purview 
of states and municipalities. During the 18th and 19th century, states and 
municipalities were the only entities capable of expanding water service 
to rapidly growing populations.  This largely contributed to the 
ascendancy of states and municipalities in water delivery9  Occurring in 
the last few decades of the 20th century international organizations like 
                                                 
9
 Hall and Lobina, “Water as a Public Service,” 2–7.  Authors’ note that states and 
municipalities as water providers began with European countries and expanded globally 
through colonialism.  France was a notable exception with private companies contracted by 
municipalities as utility operators.   
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the World Bank promoted the idea that private companies are better at 
water delivery than state or municipal management.10  Later, in the 
Aguas Argentina case study this thesis discusses how this promotion of 
privatization influenced the Argentinian government in the 1990’s.   
Privatization of water utilities exists on a spectrum.  At one end of 
the spectrum a private company may have complete ownership of a 
water utility; while at the other end a private company may be 
contracted by the state to manage a utility.  When a private company 
completely owns a water utility they own the infrastructure- processing 
(plants and sanitation) with delivery (water pipes).  Often they have 
more agency over business decision allowing more capability to increase 
profits.  At the opposite end of the spectrum a private company 
contracted to run a utility will have less agency over business decision 
and will be more dependent on generating profits through efficiency 
gains.  Despite the variability in ownership perception of water is similar.  
Privatized water utilities view water as a commodity and seek to 
maximize profits through efficiency gains.  Private utilities strive to 
produce more water at lower cost while decreasing non-revenue water.   
                                                 
10
 Bakker, “The ‘Commons’ Versus the ‘Commodity’: Alter-Globalization, Anti-
Privatization and the Human Right to Water in the Global South.,” 433–436. 
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The privatization of a state or municipally owned water utility can 
occur through a divesture sale, concession contract, a lease agreement, 
or a management contract.  A full divesture sale occurs when a water 
utility is sold by a state or municipality to a private company giving the 
organization complete control over water delivery, maintenance, 
infrastructure, and billing.11  Concession contracts are a more common 
form of privatization and occur when a company “takes over the 
management of a state owned enterprise for a given period.”12  
Privatization can also occur when private companies lease water rights 
from the state, or are contracted to manage the utility, allowing for 
government to have more influence on ownership and investment 
decisions.13 
 Publicly owned water utilities are owned and managed by a 
national or state/provincial government.  Water is viewed as a universal 
good and a natural monopoly.  Public water utilities in various countries 
tend to be owned and managed by national or state/provincial 
governments and are responsible for the maintenance and operation of 
                                                 
11 Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, “PPI Glossary - Private Infrastructure Projects - The 




all levels of water distribution and sanitation.14  Typically, a public water 
utility can be managed as a ministry or department, a statutory body, or 
as a public company, each with different management structures and 
oversight.  Water utilities that are managed as a ministry or department 
of the government may operate under a system of direct control and 
oversight and do not exist as a separate legal entity.  A water utility that 
is a statutory body is typically owned by the government and operates 
under public law, with a legal act establishing it as an autonomous 
corporate body.  A public company may demonstrate similar 
characteristics of a private company, but with government by and large 
acting as the main shareholder.15  
 Decentralized utilities are operated by local entities like city 
council, municipal government, water association, or a water 
cooperative.  Similar to publicly owned water utilities, decentralized 
water utilities view water as a universal good.  The difference is that 
utility governorship should be handled at the local level.   
Decentralization can occur in a variety of ways with the most 
common systems occurring when a national government transfers 
                                                 
14 Gleick et al., “The New Economy of Water,” 26–27. 
15 Baietti and van Ginneken, “Characteristics of Well - Permforming Public Water Utilities,” 2–3. 
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authority to a more localized entity.  For example, local entities – city 
council, municipal government, water association, or a water 
cooperative – can be given decision-making ability over water utilities 
and the authority to collect revenue in the forms of taxes or tariffs.16  
The local water entity may then serve as the policymaking and 
regulating body.  Below that body a service operator may be set up and 
charged with the day-to-day operations of the water utility.17  
Alternatively, service operations may be contracted out to a private 
company. Under a mixed capital model the municipality may choose to 
sell a small fraction of utility ownership to smaller water associations 
operating in the service areas.18 
 An increasingly popular form of decentralization is the water 
cooperative.  Similar to publicly managed management models, 
cooperatives do not seek profit but to provide universal service 
coverage.  They differ in that they are owned by the utility’s  
consumers- often called members.  Cooperative governance structure is 
typically designed to allow membership voting rights, oversight, and 
                                                 
16 Ribbot, Jesse, Democratic Decentralization of Natural Resources: Institutionalizing Popular 
Paricipation", 9. 
17 Agrawai, “Enhancing Water Services through Performance Agreements,” 7. 
18 Dickson, Eric, Management Models of Water and Sanitation: Approaches to Decentralization in 
Honduras. 
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accountability.  Utility management is accountable to member elected 
administrative and oversight boards- drawn from members.19   
 
Public Good versus Economic Good 
 
 In general, private water utilities differ from public and 
decentralized water utilities in its perception of water.  Both public and 
decentralized water utilities view water as a public good- it’s both non-
competitive and non-excludable.  In contrast, private water utilities treat 
water as an economic good and seek profit maximization.20 
Proponents of privatization, occasionally referred to as ‘market 
liberals’ or ‘neoliberals’, are characterized by the belief “that the free 
market is the best mechanism to maximize resource consumption, 
efficiency, and allocation.”21  In essence, these theories advocate for the 
removal of government ownership and the liberalization of the market.  
Market advocates argue that public resources, like water, will not be 
efficiently utilized unless managed by the private sector.  Privatization 
will treat water as an economic good by establishing a price and 
                                                 
19 Ruiz-Mier and van Ginneken, “Consumer Cooperatives,” 6–7. 
20 Budds and McGranahan, “Are the Debates on Water Privatization Missing the Point?,” 92–98. 
21 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 5–38. 
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concurrently a market.  Priced water will be treated as a commodity 
giving government, industry, and society incentive to conserve and 
protect it.  In addition, a market will bring about investment and 
improvements in water infrastructure and technology.  This will be 
possible, “through efficiency gains and better management, private 
companies will be able to lower prices, improve performance, and 
increase cost recovery, enabling systems to be upgraded and 
expanded.”22   
 Michael Goldman argues that privatization advocates, like the 
World Bank, portray the private sector as benevolent actors working 
strictly to increase water access for the global impoverished.  This 
benevolent perception is broadly fictitious.  The private sector is largely 
motivated by profit and concerned with cost recovery, which often leads 
to price increases and water cutoffs to the impoverished.23  In 
opposition, market advocates often argue that publicly managed water 
utilities attempt to ensure affordability by using cost subsidization 
schemes to keep water tariffs low.  Frederick Segerfeldt argues that 
                                                 
22 Bakker, “The ‘Commons’ Versus the ‘Commodity’: Alter-Globalization, Anti-Privatization and the 
Human Right to Water in the Global South.,” 437. 
23 Goldman, Imperial Nature, 221–271. 
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such subsidization schemes set prices so low “that on average it only 
covers about 30 percent of the water supplies expenses.”24  In essence, 
public water utilities lack the adequate cost recovery needed to prevent 
infrastructure deterioration and increase in inaccessibility of piped water.  
Essentially, privatization proponents commonly argue that privatized 
water utilities’ profit motive ensures cost recovery, which is used for 
infrastructure maintenance and expansion.25   
Within the last few decades’ market advocates have successfully 
promoted markets and privatization as a viable solution to many global 
issues related to economic development, human rights, and 
environmental degradation.26  In regards to development, market 
advocates argue that the public sector has failed in providing drinking 
water to an estimated one billion people. It is not uncommon for 
governments to engage in corrupt behavior by allocating resources to 
appease the more politically connected upper and middle class and 
neglect the impoverished.  Likewise, a privatized water sector may be 
more apt, competent, and less politically corrupt in delivering water 
                                                 
24 Segerfeldt, Water for Sale, 45. 
25 Ibid., 43–58. 
26 Dezalay and Garth, The Internationalization of Palace Wars. 
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services to the poor.27  Such arguments and studies supported the 
declaration of water as an “economic good” at the 1992 International 
Conference on Water and Environment.28  In opposition, authors Bond 
and Goldman argue that global neoliberal organizations, like the IMF 
and the World Bank, use water scarcity and development as a vehicle to 
push pro-market solutions onto developing countries.  Goldman 
describes how World Bank promotes privatization programs through a 
transnational policy network of development specialists, government 
technocrats, and journalists, who are dependent upon the Bank’s 
largesse.29  Bond draws on South Africa’s experience with utility 
privatization to show how privatization programs, imposed by external 
global institutions, fail and result in populist anti-privatization 
movements.30  A theme found in both authors’ work is that privatization 
is a project that is imposed by external actors that results in disconnect 
between the development rhetoric of neoliberal institutions and the 
interest of peoples in developing countries.      
                                                 
27 Segerfeldt, Water for Sale. 
28 Gleick et al., “The New Economy of Water,” 6. 
29 Goldman, Imperial Nature, 221–270. 
30 Bond, “Water Commodification and Decommodification Narratives.” 
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 Market proponent arguments are based on the assumption that 
water can be converted from a public good, where water is non-
excludable, to an economic good, where water is excludable and set by 
price.  In contrast, the opponents of privatization argue that the 
conversion of water into an economic good is not possible because it is 
a product that lacks competition and cost-reflective pricing. 
 With regard to competition, academics commonly contend that 
water utilities are natural monopolies because the technological and 
associated costs for water utilities are so high “it is more economical for 
a single firm to supply services than two or more competing firms.”31  
Privatization opponents argue that because water utilities operate as a 
natural monopoly there is no competition and without competition for 
market share, privatized water utilities will have no incentive to 
maximize efficiency, minimize cost, and invest in infrastructure, repairs, 
research and development of new technologies.32  Proponents of 
privatization argue that there are various schemes and mechanisms that 
simulate competition.  For example, franchise bidding, a concept 
pioneered by Demsetz in 1968, is a process where the private sector 
                                                 
31 Joskow, “Regulation of Natural Monopoly.” 
32 Vickers and Yarrow, “Economic Perspectives on Privatization,” 116. 
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competes “to become the sole producer in a naturally monopolistic 
industry.”33  Furthermore, Demsetz asserts that this process would be 
viable alternative to rate regulation in controlling the behaviors of 
natural monopolies.34  Also, benchmarking programs like IBNET use 
yardstick measurements like water coverage, water production, non-
revenue water, and unit operational costs to create a matrix where 
individual water utilities can compare their performance against one 
another.35 
 For pricing, market advocates like Peter Rogers, Radhika de Silva, 
and Ramesh Bhatia argue “the correct pricing of private and public 
goods can lead to gains in economic efficiency.”36  Using neoclassical 
marginal cost theory the authors argue that when water is correctly 
priced there is a demand in reduction, efficient reallocation of the 
resource, and increase in supply.”37  Bakker argues water is a public 
good that cannot be ‘correctly priced’ because of the temporal and 
spatial externalities associated with water.  A crude and simplified 
explanation of this point is that water utilities delivering potable piped 
                                                 
33 Prager, “Firm Behavior in Franchise Monopoly Markets,” 211. 
34 Demsetz, “Why Regulate Utilities?” 
35 van den Berg and Dailenko, “IBNET-a Global Database of the Water Sector’s Performance.” 
36 Rogers, De Silva, and Bhatia, “Water Is an Economic Good,” 2. 
37 Ibid. 
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water to consumers must adjust to a variety of geographical features.  
Some households may be located on top of a hill, while other users are 
located in a valley.  In addition, some consumers may live farther away 
from a water utility requiring more expenditure to deliver potable water.  
In essence, utilities cannot accurately price water because the delivery 
of water to consumers has uneven costs.38   
 Opponents to privatization argue that attempts to maximize profits 
by establishing a market price for water negatively impacts access in 
developing countries.  For example, Bayliss demonstrates that 
mathematical cost recovery schemes, like the Automatic Tariff 
Adjustment (ATA) formula, have negatively impacted consumers.  The 
ATA is a mathematical equation designed to pass infrastructure cost, 
inflation, and currency depreciation onto consumers.  Both the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund have promoted the ATA.39 
This mathematical equation has led to price increases by water utilities 
in Sub-Saharan Africa forcing impoverished populations to either rely on 
unimproved water resources or cut costs in other areas of family 
                                                 
38 Bakker, “Neoliberalizing Nature?,” 556–559. 
39 Bayliss, “Utility Privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 517. 
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spending such as health care.40  Privatization opponents argue that due 
to the volatile nature of water pricing utilities should be operated by the 
state because it can set tariffs that are accompanied with a policy of 
cross-subsidization which will ensure utility cost recovery without a price 
increase on the poor.  Admittedly, cross-subsidization policies can be 
enacted for privatized water utilities; however, states that are engaged 
in neoliberal projects of privatization tend to reduce government’s role, 
which may then lead to a decrease in subsidies.     
 
Financing of Local Managed Utilities 
 
 Water utilities can be managed by localized entities like municipal 
governments or community water boards.  Nobel Lauriat Elinor Ostrom’s 
work has promoted the management of common goods, like forests, 
fisheries, and water, to be the responsibility of local entities like 
municipal governments or water cooperatives.  The underpinning 
philosophy of localized management over common resources like water 
is that smaller communities with adequate resource management 
capacity (e.g. through the transfer of traditional knowledge, partnership 
                                                 
40 Bayliss and Fine, Privatization and Alternative Public Sector Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa, 105–
120. 
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with development NGOs) are more suited to maximize resource 
efficiency and eliminate waste because of accountability and local 
knowledge.41  However, critics argue that locally managed utilities have 
their own governance and financing issues.  Locally managed utilities 
are often limited in their ability to raise the capital necessary for service 
expansion.  For water cooperatives, the not-for-profit mission is often a 
deterrent for investors and international lenders.  Typically, investors 
look to maximize returns on investments; whereas cooperatives reinvest 
gains back into infrastructure development.  With limited opportunities 





Again the management categories private, public, and 
decentralized have variance.  A privatized utility could be a divesture 
sale, concession contract, or a management contract.  They are 
categorized together because they share the assumption that profit 
motive will lead to increased water coverage.  Similarly public 
                                                 
41 Ostrom, Governing the Commons. 
42 Constance, “IDBAmerica: Are Cooperatives a Better Way to Solve Latin America’s Water Problems?” 
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management also has some variance.  They could be owned and 
managed by a national, state, or provincial government.  They could 
exist as a government department or operate as a corporate board.  
They are united in the periodization of full coverage over full cost 
recovery.  Decentralization is the most challenging category- in 
particular listing municipality as a decentralized utility.  It could be 
argued that municipality should be listed as public because unlike a 
cooperative it’s a government entity.  For this thesis municipal is 
categorized as decentralized because like water cooperatives and 
associations municipal utilities prioritize servicing its community above 
full cost recovery and profits.   
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Methods and Design 
 
 
 This thesis used both statistical analysis and case studies to 
explore the impact management models of water utilities in developing 
countries have on water coverage.  Regression analysis was used to 
identify possible relationships between the water coverage of 
management models and identified dependent variables- water 
production, non-revenue water, and unit operational cost.  Case studies 
examined local political, economic, and historical factors that impacted 
management models and their water coverage.  This section describes 
how sample utilities are selected and categorized, what utility indicators 





 This thesis conducted a regression analysis using water utility data 
from IBNET- a non-governmental organization that is funded by United 
Kingdom’s Department for International Development, The World Bank, 
and The United Nations Water and Sanitation Program.  IBNET is the 
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world’s largest performance database for water and sanitation utilities.  
Performance data is used to establish benchmarks for inter-utility 
comparisons that assist practitioners, governments, and regulators in 
service improvement.43  On IBNET, water utility samples were drawn 
from developing countries.44  One critique of the sample is that it is too 
broad and the scope should be limited to a specific region with 
similarities in geography, demographics, history, economics, and 
politics.  It is not uncommon for pro-privatization literature to use similar 
data sets to reinforce such claims of improved efficiency and or 
coverage.  This analysis intends to engage in a similar exercise to test 
the significance of management models influence on water coverage.  
For this purpose, this thesis has selected a sample from 33 different 
developing countries in order to minimize the influence of a variety of 
local and specific factors on water utilities.  This sample is also 
influenced by data availability, and most significantly by the lack of data 
provided to the IBNET database.  Table 1 demonstrates the diversity of 
countries and regions represented in the study.  
                                                 
43
 “About IBNET: Objectives of IBNET.” 
44 The World Bank, “Data - Country Classification.”; For 2008, The World Bank classifies countries 
with a GNI score below $976 as low income, $976 to $3,855 lower middle income, and $3,855 to 
$11,905 as upper middle income. 
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Table 1: Sample Utilities by Country 
Country # Utilities Private Public Decentralized  
Argentina 6 4 1 1 
Armenia 2 2 0 0 
Benin 1 0 1 0 
Bolivia 2 0 0 2 
Brazil 23 0 23 0 
Burkina Faso 1 0 1 0 
Chile 11 10 0 1 
China 2 2 0 0 
Columbia 25 13 0 12 
Costa Rica 1 0 1 0 
Ecuador 1 1 0 0 
Gabon 1 0 1 0 
India 6 0 0 6 
Kyrgyz Republic 1 1 0 0 
Lao PDR 10 0 10 0 
Malaysia 1 1 0 0 
Mali 1 0 1 0 
Mauritania 1 0 1 0 
Mexico 2 2 0 0 
Mozambique 1 1 0 0 
Niger 1 0 1 0 
Panama 1 0 1 0 
Paraguay 4 0 4 0 
Philippines 3 3 0 0 
Poland 1 0 0 1 
Romania 1 1 0 0 
Russia 15 13 2 0 
Rwanda 1 0 1 0 
South Africa 14 0 0 14 
Togo 1 0 1 0 
Tunisia 1 0 1 0 
Uganda 1 0 1 0 
Uruguay 1 0 1 0 
Total 144 54 53 37 
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 Once sample utilities were identified they were categorized as 
public, private, or decentralized water utility.  As discussed in the 
Literature Review, these management models have different legal and 
governance structures.  These structures, defined in Table 2, were used 
to identify and categorize sample utilities. 
Table 2: Criteria for Utility Categorization 
Economic 
Regime 
Criteria for Utility Categorization 
Private 
Utilities that are owned, managed, or operated by the 
private sector through a full divesture sale, concession 
contract, lease agreement, or management contract. 
Public 
Utilities that are managed and operated by national or 
provincial governments as a department/ministry, statutory 
body, or a government company. 
Decentralization 
Utilities that incorporate local entities like municipal 
governments, city councils, or water boards in management 
process. 
 
Sample utilities were identified through contemporary academic 
literature and the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure 
(PPI) database.  The process of collection could have had a sample error 
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in two ways.  First, identified potential samples were matched with the 
IBNET database to ensure complete data on required indicators.  
Because of limited space on IBNET data output spreadsheets, utility 
names are manipulated and shortened.  For example “San Pedro MPC” 
and “San Pedro RACL” are two similarly named utilities from the 
Philippines.  Such manipulations of utility names can lead to confusion 
and to inaccurate categorization of samples.  Second, samples identified 
through academic literature were categorized based on the descriptions 
of utility mechanism.  A misreading of the academic literature could lead 
to a misunderstanding of the utility leading to inaccurate categorization. 
To minimize error, all three economic regime categories have a 
minimum of 30 samples.  
 Privatized utilities were identified through data collected from the 
PPI database.45  The PPI collects and publishes data on private 
investment in infrastructure projects in developing countries.  The PPI 
identified which water utilities were involved in a divesture sale or were 
actively operating under a concession, management, or lease contract.  
                                                 
45 The World Bank Group, “About the Database - Private Infrastructre Projects - The World Bank & 
PPIAF.” 
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In total 54 privatized utilities were identified: 2 full divesture sale, 32 
concession, 2 management, and 18 lease contracts.   
 Cases for the remaining two management models were identified 
and categorized by utility descriptions found in contemporary academic 
literature.  For public utilities 53 cases were identified: 20 owned by the 
national government and 33 owned by provincial/state entity 
government.  There were a total of 37 decentralized utilities that were 




 IBNET’s data is collected by participating water utilities self-
reporting measurement data on service coverage, water consumption 
and production, cost and staffing, and non-revenue water.  Data is 
reported with the use of the IBNET tool-kit, which is a collection of 
spreadsheets requiring specific information.46  The fact that data is 
collected through a self-reporting process does bring legitimate 
questions of validity to the process.  For example, Electrogaz (Rwanda’s 
water utility) reported, in 2005, that water coverage was at 119 percent 
                                                 
46 “IBNET Toolkit | IBNET Toolkit | Toolkit Instructions.” 
 38 
of the population.  This figure could be derived from a misunderstanding 
of the reporting process, inexperience, or political pressure to 
misrepresent improved performance.  This thesis will be leaving such 
figures out because of unclear, questionable, or poor description of 
criteria.   
To minimize the effects of inaccuracies, misrepresentations, and 
misunderstandings this thesis used a minimum of 30 samples, gathered 
from IBNET data, in a regression model to explore the relationship 
between categorized utility’s water coverage and water production, non-
revenue water, and unit operational cost.  This thesis has elected to use 
water coverage as the dependent variable for several reasons.  First, it 
measures the percentage of the population within the specific utility’s 
service district that has access to water services, including both 
household connections and public access water points.47  Second, 
coverage provides insight in a nation state’s conception of development 
and its implementation through concrete policies.  Chapter six of the 
United Nations Development Report 3, “Water in a Changing World” 
emphasizes how a lack of sustainable water access could inhibit 
                                                 
47 “IBNET Indicators,” 2. 
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development.48  Finally, water coverage, unlike the other three 
indicators, measures distribution and not production or delivery.  The 
three independent variables are typically used for benchmarking 
effectiveness and efficiency. 
 The first independent variable, water production, provides insight 
into the production side of water access.  Water production is measured 
by liters per person per day and expresses the total annual water 
produced and supplied, by the utility, to the distribution system.49  
Regression analysis will measure the strength of the relationship 
between an ownership model’s performance in water production and 
water coverage.  Tracking and measuring this indicator will show which 
management models produce higher level of water and if there is an 
identifiable relationship between water coverage and water production.       
 The second independent variable, non-revenue water, will observe 
the amount of wasted water produced by sample utilities.  Non-revenue 
calculates the difference in water produced and water sold in order to 
establish how much water is lost within the distribution network before 
                                                 
48 The United Nations World Water Development Report 3. 
49 “IBNET Indicators,” 3. 
 40 
it reaches the consumer.50  An analysis of water lost can provide insights 
into the health of a distribution system and validates or invalidates 
critique.  Noted earlier, a criticism of publicly managed water utilities is 
its failure to curb waste because it is treated as a common good, 
whereas privatization gives water an economic value that discourages 
waste.  Regression analysis measured the strength of the relationship 
between an ownership model’s performance in non-revenue water and 
water coverage.   
 The final independent variable, unit operational cost, measured 
the health of a utilities infrastructure.  Unit operational cost takes the 
total operational expenses of water utilities (including staffing, 
infrastructure, and maintenance) and divides them by the annual 
volume sold to show a “bottom line assessment of the mix of resources 
used to achieve the outputs required.”51  This indicator shows how much 
it costs to provide water to consumers.  Lower costs could indicate a 
better performing water delivery system coupled with cost effective 
management and staffing.  Regression analysis will measure the 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 5. 
51 Ibid., 9. 
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strength of the relationship between an ownership model’s 
performances in unit operational cost and water coverage. 
 










Y Percentage of the population with 
access to water services as a 
percentage of the total population 






X1 Litres/person/day; Total annual 
water sold expressed by population 
served per day. 
Non-Revenue 
Water 
Waste X2 Difference between water supplied 
and water sold expressed as a 




Infrastructure X3 Annual water service operational 





 Regression analysis was used to explore statistical relationships 
between the water coverage of private, public, and decentralized water 
utilities and three independent variables- water production, non-revenue 
water, and unit operational cost.  This thesis hypothesized that all three 
management models would show a relationship between water 
coverage and the three independent variables.   
 This thesis tested that decentralized water systems would have 
the most positive impacts on water allocation, infrastructure 
improvement and waste reduction.  Non-revenue water, water 
production, and unit operational cost will be equal or better to 
privatization levels and water coverage will be equal or better to publicly 
managed utilities.      
 The hypothesis for privatization asserts that utilities will perform 
well in non-revenue water, unit operational cost, and water production.  
To evaluate this hypothesis, it must first be shown that privatized 
utilities have comparatively lower levels of non-revenue water and 
operational costs while maintaining higher levels of water production.   
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 Public management, compared to privatization and 
decentralization, will have less infrastructure investment and higher 
levels of waste, and a poorer performance in water allocation.  To 
validate this hypothesis, analysis must show a lower level of water 
coverage and production coupled with higher levels of operational cost 




 Three case studies were used to explore the more nuanced 
internal and external factors that impact the water coverage of utilities 
operating in Latin America.  This thesis used media reports, academic 
literature, and available databases to explore how price, cost recovery, 
institutional arrangements (e.g. World Bank Loans), legal frameworks, 
utility history, and political environment impact the performance of 
Aguas Argentina (AASA) a privatized water utility in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina; Companhia de Saneamento Basico do Estado de São Paulo 
(SABESP) a state owned utility in São Paulo, Brazil; and Cooperativa de 
Servicios Públicos Santa Cruz (SAGUAPAC) water cooperative in Santa 
Cruz, Bolivia.  Each case study explored the unique events that have led 
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to significant changes in infrastructure, management, and operations 
and how these changes impact water coverage. 
 The three utilities were selected from the regression model case 
studies of each categorized property regime.  Additionally, the three 
utilities were selected from Latin American countries because it is a 
region that has a long history with privatization programs.  Each case 
utility was selected based on the criteria for utility categorization 
summarized in Table 2.  In addition, each utility was selected because 
each has been highlighted in academic literature as a positive example 
of a high performing utility.   
 Complementing regression analysis with these case studies 
provides a fuller picture of management models and water coverage.  
Statistical analysis will establish, if any, a relationship between water 
coverage and management models.  The case studies will provide a 
more in-depth look at how management models impact or are impacted 
by local nuanced factors.   
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Results- Multicollinearity and Regression Analysis 
 
























Public 53 77.97% 350.79 37.46% $0.37  
Private 54 87.72% 373.13 38.06% $0.31  
Decentralized 37 91.05% 281.2 33% $0.51  
Total 144 85.38% 339.92 36.43% $0.38  
 
Working under the assumption that management models do 
impact water coverage this thesis hypothesized that all three 
management models would show a relationship between water 
coverage and the three independent variables with the decentralized 
model outperforming the privately and publicly owned models.  Data 
collected from IBNET on 144 water utilities is averaged and summarized 
in table 4 (preceding).  The preceding descriptive show that 
decentralized utilities on average has higher levels of water coverage 
with lower levels of non-revenue water.  However, decentralized utilities 
have significantly higher unit operational cost.  Exploring farther, this 
thesis conducted a multiple regression analysis for each ownership type 
(private, public, and decentralized) that explored significance between 
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the dependent variable, water coverage, and the three independent 
variables- water production, non-revenue water, and unit operational 
cost.     
Regression analysis established relationships for all three 
ownership types, but only for water coverage and one independent 
variable.  Based on the results both privatized and publicly owned water 
utilities have a statistically significant inverse relationship between water 
coverage and non-revenue water.  Meaning, an increase or decrease in 
non-revenue water will result in the opposite reaction of higher or lower 
water coverage.  There was no significant relationship for water 
production and unit operational cost with water coverage.  For 
decentralized water utilities there was significance between water 
coverage and unit operational cost.  Increased unit operational cost 
correlates with higher water coverage.  There was no statistically 
significant relationship established with the other two variables- water 





A multicollinearity test was run to explore possible linkages 
between the three independent variables- water production, non-
revenue water, and unit operational cost.  A weak level inverse 
correlation of multicollinearity was found between water production and 
non-revenue water (Pearson’s r= -.40; sig= .00).  A possible 
explanation of this is that water production involves water moving 
through a utility’s infrastructure.  Non-revenue water measures water 
leaking out of a utility’s infrastructure.  There was no multicollinearity 
detected between water production and unit operational cost (Pearson’s 
r= -.15; sig= .08).  Additionally, there was no multicollinearity detected 
between non-revenue water and unit operational cost (Pearson’s r= -
.11; sig= .19).   
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One Way ANOVA 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to establish significance 
regards to management models and water variables- water coverage, 
water production, unit cost, and non-revenue water.  If significance is 
established there is the possibility that type of management model 
impacts water variables.  If no significance is established there is the 
possibility that ownership models do not impact water variables.  Three 
of the four water variables showed significance.  Non-revenue water 
shows no significance (F= .28, p= 0.76).  This is interesting because 
privatization and decentralization both have discussions on why non-
revenue water would be impacted under each ownership model.   
Table 6 ANOVA analysis of management models and water 
variables 
Constant F Sig. 
Water Coverage 18.41 0.00 
Water Production 5.95 0.03 
Non-revenue .28 0.76 
Unit Cost 20.03 0.00 





Regression- Privatized Water Utilities  
 
Multiple regression analysis of privatized water utilities was used 
to investigate significance between water coverage and water 
production, non-revenue water, and unit operational cost (adjusted 
R2=.308, F=8.857, p<.05).  This thesis hypothesized that there would 
be a significant relationship (or better) between water coverage and 
water production, non-revenue water, and unit operational cost.  
Analysis showed an inverse relationship between water coverage and 
non-revenue water (standardized β= -.684, p=.00).  There was no 
significant relationship for water production (standardized β= .267, 
p=.06) and unit operational cost (standardized β= -.083, p=.47).   
Table 7: Regression results of private water utility’s water 






Water Production .267 .06 
Non-revenue Water -.684 .00* 
Unit operational 
cost -.083 .47 




Regression- Publicly Owned Water Utilities 
 
Multiple regression analysis of public water utilities investigated 
significance between water coverage and water production, non-
revenue water, and unit operational cost (adjusted R2=. 113, F=3.201, 
p<.05).  This thesis hypothesized there would be significant relationship 
between water coverage and water production, non-revenue water, and 
unit operational cost.  Analysis showed an inverse relationship between 
water coverage and non-revenue water (standardized β= -.481, p=.01).  
There was no significant relationship for water production (standardized 
β= .113, p=.46) and unit operational cost (standardized β= -.249, 
p=.10).   
 
Table 8: Regression results of public water utility’s water 





Water Production .113 .46 
Non-revenue Water -.481 .01* 
Unit operational 
cost .249 .10 




Regression- Decentralized Water Utilities 
 
Multiple regression analysis of decentralized water utilities was 
used to investigate the relationship between water coverage and water 
production, non-revenue water, and unit operational cost (adjusted 
R2=. 094, F=2.245, p<.05).  This thesis hypothesized that there would 
be the relationship between water coverage and water production, non-
revenue water, and unit operational cost.  Analysis showed significant 
relationship between water coverage and unit operational cost 
(standardized β= .383, p=.03).  There was no significant relationship for 
water production (standardized β= .288, p=.09) and non-revenue water 
(standardized β= .086, p=.60).   
Table 9: Regression results of decentralized water utility’s 





Water Production .288 .09 
Non-revenue Water .086 .60 
Unit operational 
cost .383 .03* 






Regression analysis showed that there is the possibility that at 
some level management models can impact water coverage.  For 
publicly and privately owned water utilities, plugging leaks can translate 
into high rates of water coverage.  For decentralized water utilities high 
levels of unit operational cost can increase water coverage.  Regression 
analysis also shows that broad claims about ownership, efficiency, and 
improved water coverage should be suspect.  Not one ownership model 
established significant relationship between water coverage and all three 
independent variables.   
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Privatization: The Buenos Aires Water Concession 
 
 
 In 1993, the Buenos Aires public water utility, Obras Sanitarias de 
la Nación (OSN), was privatized as a 30-year concession contract and 
awarded to the private water consortium Aguas Argentina (AASA).  
Privatization was implemented with the goal of achieving universal water 
coverage through efficiency gains and full cost recovery.  AASA 
continuously failed to meet performance targets, which led to the 
renationalization of the utility in 2006.  This section presents an analysis 
of the AASA privatization case study and argues that the concession 
collapsed because a rushed privatization process established institutions 
that failed to mediate the unique challenges created by local historical, 




 The city of Buenos Aires is a federally administered autonomous 
district located within Buenos Aires province on the southern side of the 
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Rio de la Plato from which the city draws 92 percent of its fresh water.52  
The city itself includes the Capital District (the core) and 24 surrounding 
municipalities, often referred to as the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Region 
(BAMR).  AASA service area only includes the Capital District and 17 
surrounding municipalities, servicing (at the time of concession) a 
population of 9.3 million.53  When this thesis refers to Buenos Aires it is 
in reference to this service area and not the greater metropolitan 
region.54  
 This case study begins by contextualizing the Buenos Aires service 
area and its political environment.  This will be followed by a discussion 
of how the political environment of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
impacted the privatization process. Finally, this thesis will discuss how a 
rushed privatization process contributed to weak governance that was 
advantageous for AASA.  
   
Historical Context 
 
                                                 
52 Alcázar, Abdala, and Shirley, “The Buenos Aires Water Concession,” 3.  The remaining 8 percent is 
provided by wells. 
53 Loftus and McDonald, “Of Liquid Dreams,” 186.  At privatization the population of service area was 
8.6 million.  It expanded to 9.3 million with the inclusion of Quilmes municipality in 1995.  
54 Please see map in Appendix A. 
 55 
 During the 18th century and early 19th century, in most European 
cities, water access was provided by private companies or municipalities.  
However, the industrial revolution coupled with population growth 
outpaced their capabilities of providing potable drinking water.  
Commonly, these cities’ water systems were polluted, stagnant, and a 
breeding for water borne illness.  Frequent epidemics of malaria, 
cholera, typhoid complemented with scientific exploration of water 
borne illness led to a re-thinking on water management.  Over the late 
19th and early 20th century the concept that maintaining healthy water 
systems decreased epidemics gained consensus.  Water needed to be 
cleaned, it needed to be running, and it needed to be protected from 
waste.  This was an investment well beyond just building sewers and 
laying water pipes.  This re-thinking was a significant change in urban 
planning and required investment well beyond the capabilities of private 
companies or municipal governments.  The state was the only actor 
capable of financing the modernization of water infrastructure.  By the 
20th century, in most European cities, the state is the main actor in 
financing, regulating, and managing water.  A notable exception is 
France where the state partnered with private water companies and 
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subsidized the modernization of their water systems- a point that is 
reviewed later in this section.55 
 Hall and Lobina note that in the colonies the development of water 
systems differed- colonial policies limited water access to colonial elites 
while native populations were charged at full cost recovery prices.56   
For Argentina, the colonial history has played a significant role in 
shaping the water politics of Buenos Aires.  It contributed to ‘canilla 
libre’ (translation: all you can use), a principle belief that water service 
should be provided by the state.  After independence the concept of 
public water became associated with independence, while payment for 
water was associated with colonialism. 57    
 The Argentinean government established OSN in 1912 with the 
original responsibility of managing and expanding all urban area’s water 
and sanitation services.  Buenos Aires experienced decades of service 
expansion, but, economic mismanagement and canilla libre inhibited 
adequate cost recovery, and expansion stalled in the 1950 until 
privatization began in 1993.  In 1983, with stalled expansion, poor cost 
                                                 
55
 Goubert and others, The Conquest of Water. 
56 Hall, Lobina, and others, “Water as a Public Service,” 6. 
57 Schneier-Madanes, “From Well to Network,” 46. 
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recovery, and a debt crisis –referred to as the lost decade– the 
Argentinean government, under pressure from the IMF and World Bank, 
decentralized OSN.58  The responsibility of water and sanitation services 
was passed on to the provincial governments.   Consequently, as Botton 
and Gouvello argue, the decentralization of OSN created access barriers 
within the concession area.  Decentralization created two different 
utilities, OSN (federally owned) and Aguas Bonarenses (provincially 
owned), within the Greater Buenos Aires metropolitan region.  In both 
service areas, peripheral municipalities, like Buenos Aires’ Alimirante 
Brown, had lower access levels compared to centralized municipalities 
with higher access levels.59  Incidentally, periphery areas also had 
higher levels of poverty than centrally located areas like the Capital 
District.60  As will be touched on later, fragmentation created challenges 
to service expansion in the periphery municipalities.  
 Issues of fragmentation and cost recovery were not address 
during the 1980s.  The newly elected Alfonsin government, responding 
to the debt crisis, prioritized debt repayment at the expense of public 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 47–48. 
59 Please see Map 2 (Appendix B). 
60 Botton and Gouvello, “Water and Sanitation in the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Region.” 
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works.  This negligence led to infrastructure underinvestment, 
deterioration, and up to 45 percent of water loss due to infrastructure 
leakage.61  By 1993, one-third of Buenos Aires service area connections 
were unregistered, customers frequently did not receive or pay utility 
bills, and 68 percent of collected revenue was from business and 
industries that represented 2 percent of OSN’s customer base.62  By the 
end of the 1980s the debt crisis escalated, which resulted in a loss of 
confidence in traditional economic policy solutions and an electorate 
clamoring for a new economic direction. 
 
The Push for Privatization  
 
 The loss of confidence in the Alfonsin administration created an 
opportunity for proponents of privatization, both internal and external to 
Argentina, to push market oriented policies.  External actors, most are 
from Argentina’s foreign creditors, including the IMF and the World 
Bank, pushed privatization through two approaches.  The first was 
through experts who argued Argentina’s inefficient public sector 
crowded out the private sector and inhibited economic recovery.  The 
                                                 
61 Alcázar, Abdala, and Shirley, “The Buenos Aires Water Concession,” 4. 
62 Porporato and Robbins, “Privatisation and Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies,” 196. 
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solution came in the form of a set of economic proposals -commonly 
referred to as the Washington Consensus- that reduced the public 
sector, deregulated the economy, and removed barriers to foreign 
trade.63  The second approach was that global lending institutions used 
previous foreign debt and future loans to pressure Argentina into 
accepting market oriented policy solution.64   Victoria Murillo argues that 
because of an atmosphere of elevated external financial pressure voters 
were more accepting of privatization programs.65  During the 1989 
general election the voting public viewed privatization programs 
favorably.  In Buenos Aires, 16 percent of the population opposed 
privatization.66  Running on a privatization platform, Carlos Menem, a 
candidate from the Peronist party, was elected president.   
 Menem’s economic agenda began with combating the 3,080 
percent hyperinflation by artificially pegging the value of the 
Argentinean peso to the US dollar.  It was believed that by artificially 
linking the peso to the dollar it would enhance the credibility of the 
currency, which lowered the perceived risk of investing in Argentina’s 
                                                 
63 Baer and Montes-Rojas, “From Privatization to Re-Nationalization,” 325. 
64 Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work, 222. 
65 Murillo, “Political Bias in Policy Convergence,” 464–467. 
66 Alcázar, Abdala, and Shirley, “The Buenos Aires Water Concession,” 12. 
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private companies.67  Next, the Menem administration pushed through 
the National Administrative Reform Law (No 23, 696) and presidential 
decrees 2074/90, 1443/91, and 2408/91 authorizing the full, or partial, 
privatization of all state owned enterprises in the form of concession 
contracts.68  Following this, over 115 SOEs were privatized between 
1990 and 1994.69  Privatizing OSN began in 1991 by making the utility 
financially appealing to bidders.  In February of 1991, tariffs increased 
by 25 percent and by another 29 percent in April.70  Two years later, in 
May 1993, Aguas Argentina, through a competitive bidding process, won 
the concession contract with a proposed tariff reduction of 26.9 percent.   
 AASA is a consortium of organizations led by the largest 
shareholder, the French water company Suez.71  A breakdown of AASA 
investors shows a consortium consisting primarily of large international 
organizations with a significant amount of resources and influence.  The 
exception is the 10 percent ownership by the employees.  
 
Failed Privatization 
                                                 
67 Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work, 221. 
68 Loftus and McDonald, “Of Liquid Dreams,” 182–183. 
69 Estache and Trujillo, “Privatization in Latin America The Good, the Ugly, and the Unfair,” 1. 
70 Loftus and McDonald, “Of Liquid Dreams,” 190. 
71 At the time of purchase Suez was Lyonnaise des Eaux, became Suez after a merger in 1997. 
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 AASA’s 26.9 percent tariff reduction was to be offset through 
efficiency gains and waste reductions.  Immediately following 
privatization, AASA –with the union’s cooperation- used early retirement 
programs to reduce the workforce by 50 percent.72  Additionally, AASA 
decreased non-revenue water from pre-privatization levels of 45 percent 
to 32 percent by 2001.73  However, despite such efficiency gains AASA 
failed to meet performance goals established in the concession contract 
because the economic geography and water politics74 of the concession 
area made expansion unprofitable in certain municipalities.   
 During the late 1980s and early 1990s proponents of water 
privatization promoted the French model for water service management.  
This model was founded on a public-private partnership formalized 
through a concession contract, and greatly influenced the design of the 
AASA concession contract.   The model has been operating and 
developing since the 1850s.  Pezon argues that French model 
concessions often fail because conditions for success are unique to 
France and difficult to replicate in other areas.  In particular, French 
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concessions in the 19th century were originally based on a principle of 
full cost recovery; however, this principle failed to generalize water 
access and was abandoned in the 20th century for concessions that 
implemented public financing.75  For Buenos Aires, this lesson was 
overlooked and its concession contract was based on a principal of full 
cost recovery, which was challenged by fragmentation, canilla libre, 
information asymmetries, and a weak regulator.  
 AASA’s concession contract established a tariff regime that 
included price cap and cost plus pricing schemes creating a 
contradictory and inefficient tariff regime. A price cap scheme –often 
used by utilities in France and Britain- sets a price ceiling for the utility 
but then creates artificial competition by forcing the utility to earn 
profits through efficiency gains.  The cost plus pricing allowed AASA to 
renegotiate its tariff cap when the firm’s operational cost increases by 7 
percent.76  As shown in the following paragraphs, information 
asymmetries allowed AASA to circumvent the price cap because it 
provided the firm the opportunity to increase tariff charges through 
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property reclassification.  The price cap mechanism was further 
undermined because of a weak regulator.  AASA was able to renegotiate 
several tariff increases.   
 The regulator Ente Tripartito de Obras de Servicios de 
Saneamiento (ETOSS) was created to monitor AASA service expansion, 
the quality of service, and establish tariff rates.77  At the time of 
establishment, ETOSS was staffed with about 70 former OSN 
employees, mostly engineers and technicians. 78  Very few had the skills, 
knowledge, and experience required for a regulator, such as economics, 
law, and accounting.79  This lack of experience was most problematic 
with regards to setting tariff rates, a holdover from OSN.  This was 
mostly because reforming the tariff would take time, and changes ran 
the risk of discouraging potential investors.80  The inherited rate also 
had different pricing structures for metered and non-metered 
customers.  The pricing structure differences between metered and non-
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metered customers are significant because it enabled AASA’s 
opportunistic price inflation.     
 Metered customers represented a small portion of connections, 
about 8 percent in 1995.81  For the most part, this was due to decades 
of canilla libre coupled with meter installation charges implemented after 
privatization. For metered customers, the pricing formula was:  
MTij = 0.5 * BBTij + Pi * K * (C - Ã) 
MTij and BBTij define the type of service and customer category.  (C - 
Ã) is a pricing scheme that allowed for a flat rate for zero marginal cost 
for the first 30m3.  After 30m3 the consumer is then charged $0.33m3 for 
water services only, or $0.66 for water and sewage services.82  A 
consumer was allowed to switch from un-metered to metered service, 
however additional connection charges and meter reading cost typically 
served as a financial deterrent for switching to metered service.83 
 The non-metered pricing scheme lacked a flat rate mechanism and 
contained variables that allowed for AASA to inflate customer cost.  The 
formula for non-metered service is:  
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BBTij = GTij * K * Z * (SC * E + ST/10) 
A similarity in both formulas was a mechanism used to adjust tariffs that 
was represented by K.  For metered connections the variable K was 
calculated with variable C, which measured consumption and was 
mechanically measured by a meter that could be checked by consumers 
and ETOSS.  For non-metered customers the variables Z and E are 
coefficients that vary dependent on property age and location.84  
Together, the variables K, C, E established a pricing scheme -often 
referred to as the K factor- that is dependent upon property 
characteristics.  The K factor was often inaccurate because Buenos Aires 
lacked a strong legal property system capable of defining private 
property.  In addition, OSN failed to maintain an updated property 
database leading to a lack of information about property within the 
service area.85   
 After privatization AASA, through field surveys and aerial 
photography, updated resident information.  With an updated database 
AASA had an information advantage over ETOSS in the renegotiation of 
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tariff increases to reclassified residents.  First, identified commercial 
property was reclassified from residential to industrial, increasing cost 
by 1.9 times.86  Next, AASA reclassified customers based on the age or 
value of their property, typically resulting in higher water bills for the 
reclassified resident.  Finally, AASA reclassified customers from 
residential to non-residential, a classification that typically doubled their 
water bill.87    
 In addition to reclassification, in 1994, AASA also negotiated with 
ETOSS a 13.5 percent tariff increase.   Despite the tariff increase the 
average water bill was about $16.53, which was still lower than 1993 
OSN tariff charge of $19.40.88  However, with privatization came the 
implementation of two new access charges for newly connected 
residents.  The first, called connection fee (CF), was an upfront charge 
of $335 to gain access to the water grid.  The second, infrastructure 
charge (IC), was a $785 fee (payable in installments) used to pay for 
network expansion and was only charged to new customers after work 
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was completed.89  For customers who could not afford access fees AASA 
was required to help with financing.  The CF and IC placed the cost of 
service expansion onto new connections.90  The cost burden to new 
customers played a significant role in causing AASA to fall short of 
performance goals.  
Table 10: Concession Contract Service Performance Targets 
Target Year 
% of Population Coverage 
Water Sewage 
1993 (0) 70 58 
1998 (5) 81 64 
2003 (10) 90 73 
2013 (20) 97 82 
2023 (30) 100 90 
Source: Idelovitch, E. and Ringskog, K. Private Sector in Water Supply and 
Sanitation in Latin America. 
  
Stretched over the 30-year concession period AASA was required 
to meet performance targets for service expansion, network renovation, 
and decreasing non-revenue water.  AASA needed to expand water 
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coverage, from 70 percent (roughly 6 million) of residents in 1993, to 81 
percent (increase of 1.3 million) by 1998.91  Initially, Aguas Argentina 
expanded water service by 949 thousand residents and sanitation 
service by 279 thousand residents.  For the first 5-year performance 
target AASA was about 28 percent (382,000) short of target for water 
connections and about 70 percent (650,000) short of target in 
sanitation.92  One reason for this shortfall is AASA expanded into areas 
with higher income stream.  Typically, these areas were closer to the 
service area’s center, had high population density and low poverty 
levels.  Because expansion was being financed through new connections 
AASA typically avoided periphery municipalities with low population and 
high levels of poverty.93  AASA delays in expansion of services ETOSS 
began in 1996 to levy fines against the firm.94  In addition to these 
fines, AASA also suffered financially because customers refused to pay 
their water bills – a cost AASA estimated to be at 30 million.95   
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In 1997, mostly because of canilla libre and ETOSS fines AASA 
pushed for contract renegotiation.  ETOSS’s board of directors 
superseded the regulator and approved renegotiation.  The six-member 
board of directors was filled with political appointees (significantly 
influenced by the Menem administration) drawn from the national, 
provincial, and municipal levels of government.96  By 1997, the AASA 
concession had become a political liability to the Menem administration 
that had an invested interest in ensuring the success of privatization.97  
ETOSS was left out of renegotiations and the Ministry of Economy, the 
Department of Natural Resources, and Aguas Argentina carried out 
negotiations.98  
 Renegotiations produced significant changes in pricing and service 
expansion.   First, the ETOSS fines against AASA were dropped and 
service expansion targets were relaxed.  Most significantly, IC charges 
were dropped and CF charges were lowered to $120 spread out over a 
five-year period in $4 bi-monthly charges.  IC charges were replaced 
with a $4.00 universal charge to all customers called the “Servicio 
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Universal y Mejora Ambiental” (Universal Service and Environmental 
Improvement), commonly referred to as SUMA. The renegotiated 
payment scheme lowered cost for new connections by 18 percent 
($26.65 monthly before renegotiation to $22.53 monthly after).  For 
connected residents their monthly payments increased 24 percent, from 
$16.53 to $20.53.99  The logic to the new price scheme was to 
implement cross-subsidization to spread out the cost of expansion 
throughout the service area.  Solutions reached in renegotiation were 
focused on cost and price.  Renegotiation sidelined ETOSS and furthered 
weakened it institutionally.  Additionally, renegotiation failed to address 
the information asymmetries between AASA and ETOSS.100   
 Despite renegotiation and tariff changes AASA still failed to meet 
its 2003 performance goals for both water (84 percent coverage) and 
sanitation (63 percent coverage).101  This shortfall was largely due to 
AASA exposure to the global market; specifically tariffs being linked to 
US dollars.  As noted earlier, Menem’s administration pegged the 
Argentinean peso to the US dollar in 1989, sowing the seeds of 
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economic turmoil a decade later.  External economic shock such as the 
1997 East Asian crisis, slumping commodity prices and financial turmoil 
in Brazil sent Argentina’s economy into a tailspin in 2000.  The economic 
crisis sent unemployment soaring past 20 percent and reduced 
Argentina’s GDP by 12 percent.  Furthermore, because the peso was 
pegged to the US dollar it was appreciating in value.  As a result, 
Argentina’s exports increased in price while imports decreased.102  In 
2002, interim President Eduardo Duhalde, who replaced Menem’s 
successor Fernando de la Rúa-, pushed through the ‘Economic 
Emergency Law’ removing the peso’s tie to the dollar, which quickly 
decreased in value to 1 dollar = 3.5 pesos.103   The devaluation of the 
pesos resulted in a $500 million dollar loss for AASA, destroying the 
firm’s net-worth.  Further complicating matters for AASA, the Duhalde 
administration instituted tariffs freezes in 2003, dashing AASA hopes of 
tariff increases to recover loss.104  Following this SUEZ pushed to cut its 
losses and sell its share, however, with economic instability there were 
few takers.  In 2005, Suez decided to walk away from AASA and in 
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March 2006 the private water company was renationalized forming the 




 Before 1990, water access for OSN was below 70 percent of the 
service area’s users.  The utility’s infrastructure was underinvested and 
deteriorating- water leakage was about 47 percent.  The IMF, World 
Bank, and Argentina’s foreign creditors pushed privatization as a 
solution.  The AASA privatization is an example of the oversimplification 
of challenges to water access.  AASA failed because rushed privatization 
neglected local historical, political, and economic factors all of which 
created unique challenges to service provision and expansion.  
Furthermore, this rushed process created weak water governance that 
failed to curtail the opportunistic behavior of AASA.   
The concession contract required AASA to meet expansion targets 
every five years.  AASA did not succeed in meeting these performance 
targets for two reasons- first; any service expansion was mostly 
concentrated into areas with identifiable revenue.  A significant reason 
for this was because expansion, at first, was financed through charges 
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to new connections. Areas without identifiable revenue were typically 
located on the periphery of the service area and had higher levels of 
poverty.  Second, the weak governance structure established by the 
rushed privatization process failed to mediate obstacles to expansion 
posed by local factors such as ‘canilla libre’.  Renegotiation only 
weakened the regulator further and resulted in market solutions that 
failed to address canilla libre.   
 74 
Public Ownership: Water and Sanitation in São Paulo 
 
 
 The Brazilian water and sanitation utility the Companhia de 
Saneamento Basico do Estado de São Paulo (SABESP) is a public 
corporation and is primarily owned by the state of São Paulo.  
Established in 1973, SABESP was created through government 
development programs aimed at establishing and strengthening state 
owned water and sanitation companies.  SABESP was established during 
a period of exponential industrial growth and chaotic urbanization in São 
Paulo.  Noted by Silva and discussed later in this section, during the 
1970’s and early 1980’s SABESP largely prioritized water coverage to 
support São Paulo growing industrial demands.  In doing so SABESP 
neglected expanding service coverage in low-income and impoverished 
neighborhoods.105   Today, SABESP is often used by academics and 
practitioners as an example of a high performing state owned water 
utility.  It has a reputation for efficiency, well regarded for service 
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delivery, often maintains full cost recovery, and water coverage is nearly 
universal.106 
This thesis argues that the rise of democracy in Brazil played a 
significant role in SABESP’s success in expanding services.  In 1985, 
Brazil’s military regime collapsed, opening the door for national 
democracy.  With the rise of democracy, a grassroots protest from 
residents of São Paulo’s shanty towns, commonly referred to as favelas, 
pushed for service expansion into their communities.  Protest 
encouraged the implementation of SABESP’s Recovery Program- a fiscal, 
administrative, and operational streamlining, credited for improving 
operational efficiency, reducing non-revenue water, and achieving full 
cost recovery.  The Recovery Program provided SABESP with the 




SABESP is one of the world’s largest water and sanitation utilities 
providing water to the entire state of São Paulo.  São Paulo is located on 
Brazil’s southeast coast and is surrounded by the state of Rio de Janeiro 
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to the north, Paraná to the south, and Minas Gerais to the north and 
west.  Together these five states constitute Brazil’s most economically 
developed, diverse, and productive region.  However, São Paulo is 
Brazil’s wealthiest and most populated state.  Its population is 
approximately 43 million inhabitants and the state accounts for 33 
percent of Brazil’s GDP-107    
SABESP provides water service to approximately 23.6 million and 
sewage service to approximately 20 million consumers.  Its service area 
is separated into two-regions- the Regional Systems and the 
Metropolitan Region of Sao Paulo (MRSP).  The Regional System is 
geographically larger and encompasses 343 municipalities, most of 
which are rural.  The MRSP is demographically larger and services the 
city of São Paulo (the state’s capital) and the surrounding 27 
municipalities- approximately 20.4 million residents.  As of 2010, the 
MRSP contained 46 percent of the state’s population and is one of the 
most densely populated urban areas in the world.  The MRSP represents 
SABESP’s core market.  108  
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Beginning in the 1960’s the state of São Paulo experienced 
exponential population and economic growth.  Drawn by employment 
prospects, many rural Brazilians migrated to the MRSP to fill low-income 
industrial positions.  In 1965, the MRSP encompassed 550km2 and had a 
population of approximately 6.5 million Paulistas.  By 1980, MRSP’s 
population grew to 12.6 million within MRSP’s geographically expanded 
900km2 area.109  Discussed in the following the MRSP’s high decades 
long growth rate nearly double the city area because of continued 
migration to the periphery. From 1970 to 1991 the MRSP averaged a 
three percent growth rate, but the growth was disproportionately 
distributed throughout the region.  São Paulo City, MRSP’s core, 
averaged an annual growth rate of 2.3 percent.  Comparatively, MRSP’s 
peripheral growth rate was around 4.7 percent.110  The periphery’s 
higher growth rate is attributed to its lower-cost of living.  During the 
1980’s property values in Sao Paulo were high, and a relaxation of 
rental laws allowed rental property owners to regularly increase rental 
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fees, which dis-incentivized affordable rental housing.  The increases in 
rent and property value raised the cost of living in the MRSP’s core, and 
pushed the metropolitan area’s growing poor population to the 
periphery municipalities.111     
Additionally, the lack of enforcement of environmental laws 
allowed favelas to encroach upon the sources of the state’s freshwater 
supply.  Protective measures, in the form of area-based regulations, 
were instituted by the state in 1975 and 1976. The regulations were 
intended to prevent development from occurring within critical 
watersheds.  Poor enforcement within the protected areas allowed for 
their illegal occupations, which lead to high population growth and 
subsequent severe pollution within the watershed.112  In 1971, the 
population living in favelas was approximately 41,000 Paulistas, which 
rose to approximately 1.9 million by 1993.113 
 
Resistance to Water and Sewage Service Expansion 
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In 1971, approximately 20 percent of favelas received water 
service and less than 1 percent received sewage service.  By 1987, 
water service to the favelas had grown exponentially, to approximately 
99 percent.114  While one might conclude that the establishment of 
SABESP significantly contributed to favela service expansion, this would 
be an oversimplification.  Argued below, Brazil’s military government, in 
partnership with the government of São Paulo established a state-supply 
model that prioritized support for Brazil’s rapidly growing industrial 
demands.  SABESP prioritized service delivery and expansion to 
accommodate São Paulo growing industrial needs.  This prioritization 
came at the expense of the rapidly growing favelas resulting in a lack of 
water access.  Furthermore, SABESP resisted service expansion into the 
favelas.  The expansion of service into favelas resulted when a shift in 
political regimes allowed for greater civic influence on the 
aforementioned institutions and São Paulo’s water governance.   
In 1971, Brazil’s military regime implemented the Plano Nacional 
de Saneament Basico (PLANSA), a national plan that centralized water 
and sewage services.  PLANSA used a mixture of tax revenues and 
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federal backed loans to consolidate smaller municipal water and sewage 
companies into larger state owned utilities.115  Under PLANSA, SABESP 
was established through the centralization of São Paulo’s water and 
sanitation municipal companies- COMPASP, SAEC, and SANESP.  
Furthermore, SABESP was established as a public corporation with the 
requirement that the state of São Paulo own two-thirds the utility’s 
voting-shares.116 
During the 1970’s and early 80’s service expansion into the favelas 
was impeded by SABESP and government.  Brazil’s ruling military regime 
launched PLANSA to support Brazil’s rapidly increasing industrial needs, 
and not develop universal household access.  PLANSA’s water and 
sewage services became a state supply model that favored industrial 
centers over low in-come centers.117  São Paulo’s government did not 
want to extend public services to favelas because they were viewed as 
illegal settlements.  Public service to land occupations would have 
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legitimized the illegal communities.118  SABESP argued that expanding 
service in the favelas had high technical and engineering challenges that 
would be too costly to implement.  SABESP engineering and 
infrastructure standards were aligned with consolidated organized urban 
areas like São Paulo city.  Unlike these areas, the favelas were 
disorganized, crowded, and often built on steep hills, flood plains, or 
along waterways.  Despite national, state, and SABESP’s resistance to 
favela service expansion; these marginalized communities experienced a 
32 percent increase in water and sewage services by 1980.  This 
continued to climb, reaching 98 percent by 1987.119  Argued in the 
following, much of this service increase can be attributed to the gradual 
democratization of Brazil, beginning in the late 70’s.   
 
Civic Movements and Service Expansion 
 
After the 1964 coup, the newly empowered military regime 
implemented a variety of new laws to consolidate power and erode 
democratic institutions.  One such law only allowed two national political 
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parties- the National Renewal Alliance (ARENA) and the Movimiento 
Democrático Brasiliero (MDB).  ARENA was the conservative party and 
favored by the military government.  The MDB was the liberal party and 
was formed out of the consolidation of the Brazilian Labor and Social 
Democratic parties.  Despite the existence of the MDB party Brazil’s 
government mostly operated as a one party system.  National, state, 
and municipal positions –including President, governors, and mayors- 
were appointed by senior military leaders and given rubberstamped 
approval by the ARENA controlled congress.120  However, in 1974 this 
political control began to erode. The newly appointed President General 
Ernesto Geisel, began a program of gradual re-democratization- often 
referred to the as the abuerta (opening) or the decompression.121  
Essential, the abuerta was a rollback of laws limiting media and political 
opposition.  This rollback helped to increase the influence of the MDB, 
forcing ARENA candidates to compete for votes.122   
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In São Paulo in the early 70’s, faveledos (favela residents) began 
to protest for changes in property laws, infrastructure improvements, 
and access to public service- such as water, sewage, and electricity.  
The faveledos movement often used non-violent protest targeted at 
both municipal and state government institutions and public service 
providers- like SABESP.  For example, in one protest in 1984- faveledos 
marched on SABESP headquarter delivering buckets of stagnant water 
from the favelas.  Such protests played a significant role in pressuring 
ARENA candidates to institute more progressive policies towards the 
favelas.123   
In 1979, the City of São Paulo’s new mayor, Reynaldo de Barros 
(ARENA candidate), charged the Bureau of Social Welfare (COBES) and 
the Municipal Development Agency (EMURB) with expanding urban 
services into local favelas.  The municipal agency’s launched 
PROFAVELA, a pilot program designed to provide favelas with water, 
sewage, electricity, storm drains, and retention walls.  Specifically for 
water, PROFAVELA was limited in scope. For the first three years, the 
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pilot program impacted 26 favelas (three percent of favelas) providing 
approximately 14,200 water connections.124   
Despite impacting only three percent of favelas, PROFAVELA was a 
significant step in SABESP service expansion.  It served as an incubator 
for innovation in water service expansion and facilitated institutional 
change at SABESP.  PROFAVELA worked with civic organizations to 
pioneer new construction techniques that are more adaptable to the 
favelas chaotic layout.  For example, the incorporation of a high-density 
polyethylene pipe (PEAD) allowed for the expansion of water services 
into the narrow winding streets of the favelas. PEAD was fairly 
inexpensive, light-weight, and most importantly flexible enough to 
navigate the chaotic favela landscape.125  Favela civic organization 
played an active role in the PROFAVELA program.  First, favela residents 
monitored the quality of the expansion work; rejecting poor quality 
installation.  Second, favela residents formed volunteer work brigades 
that assisted by pre-digging trenches for ground water pipes.  The work 
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brigades helped to reduce the timeline of service expansion and its 
construction cost.126   
COBES and EMURB, for the most part, spearheaded PROFAVALA.  
SABESP was an unenthusiastic participant.  Both COBES and EMURB 
worked to convince SABESP to lower its engineering standards and 
accept a PEAD water infrastructure. Under a formal agreement SABESP 
agreed to provide service to the 14,200 new water connections with the 
caveat that the municipality covered the expansion cost.127  PROFAVELA 
was SABESP first experience with providing service to the favelas.  
Institutionally the utility maintained its resistance to servicing the 
favelas; however, this would change with Brazil’s continued 
democratization. 
In 1982, Franco Montoro, candidate of the newly formed Brazilian 
Democratic Movement Party (PMDB)128 won São Paulo’s first open 
democratic gubernatorial election. Initially, Governor Montoro did not 
respond to the favelado protest.  In response, protestors continued 
marches on the governor’s mansion, the state capital, and SABESP 
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headquarters.  In 1985, Governor Montoro finally responded by 
replacing SABESP’s president.  The new president used SABESP’s 
employees connected with PROFAVELA to expand water and sewage 
service to all favelas within the utility’s service area.  Under SABESP’s 
new leadership, with the assistances of the favela work teams, and the 
use of PROFAVELA construction techniques- piped water service 
expanded to 99 percent of favelas by the end of the decade.129   
 
Democratization, Clientelism, and the Recovery Program 
 
During the 1980’s Brazil suffered from hyperinflation brought on 
by high external debts and low growth resulting in a decrease of the 
availability and effectiveness of federal funds.130  While federal funding 
was decreasing the state of São Paulo’s spending increased.  A decrease 
in federal funds and the roll back of the military regime resulted in a 
decentralization of power to the states. Governance at the state level 
                                                 
129 Watson, “Water and Sanitation in São Paulo, Brazil,” 47–55. 
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was plagued by clientelism and rent seeking behavior, which led to the 
manipulation of state owned companies and banks.131   
São Paulo’s governing administrations used the states’ two 
commercial banks- BANESPA and Nossa Caixa- to provide loans to the 
state treasury and state owned companies.  Frequently, SABESP was 
used to take out loans from the BANESPA or Nossa Caixa to cover the 
government’s budget short falls.  Such loans were used for government 
spending unrelated to SABESP.132  During the late 80’s and early 90’s 
SABESP’s water infrastructure decayed.  Non-revenue water increased 
and service quality deteriorated.  By 1994, six million consumers located 
in the MRSP frequently experienced water rationing.  Additionally, in 
that year, a currency crisis of Brazil’s Cruzeiro led to collapse and federal 
takeover of BANESPA and Nossa Caixa.  The collapse of São Paulo’s 
commercial banks revealed that SABESP was R$223 million (USD$232 
million) in debt and had an immediate liquidity problem.133   
In 1995, Saõ Paulo’s incoming governor Mário Covas and SABESP 
implemented policies to improve operational efficiency, reduce cost, and 
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increase revenue.  First, the government of São Paulo addressed 
SABESP’s liquidity problem by providing a capital injection of R$800 
million.  Second, SABESP began selling company shares on the Brazilian 
Stock Exchange (BOVESPA) resulting in an additional R$507 million of 
revenue in by 1998.134  Third, SABESP reduced its workforce from 
20,516 in 1994 to 19,340 in 1998, while at the same time increasing 
connection per employee from 330 to 440.135  Finally, SABESP 
implemented a new tariff that increased revenue by including service 
charges to new connection in the favelas.  SABESP tariff structure uses 
a progressive block pricing structure that prices households based on 
economic status. SABESP’s tariff has two separate consumer categories- 
residential and non-residential. Non-residential consumers are 
commercial, industrial, and governmental users.  Residential consumers 
are domestic households that are further categorized as standard 
residential, social136, and favela; the latter two are classifications created 
for the benefit of low-income137 consumers.138 The categories are used 
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to identify customers price levels based on a progressive block pricing 
system.  SABESP’s 2004 block pricing uses tier groupings with price 
increases as consumption increases.  Both non-residential and standard 
residential have higher prices per tier group and have only 4 tier groups 
compared to the low-income categories 5 tier groups.  The purpose is 
that Non-residential and standard residential consumption and pricing 
levels are designed to bring in higher revenue in order to offset service 
and connection cost to both social and favela consumers.139  Changes 
implemented in the Recovery Program helped SABESP go from a net 
profit loss of R$223 million in 1994 to a net profit of R$25 million in 
1995 and R$542.1 million in 1998.  Additionally, SABESP’s improved 
fiscal situation allowed the utility access to foreign loans.140   
During the Recovery Program Brazil’s economy improved.  From 
1991 to 1994 Brazil’s currency the Cruzeiro was averaging and inflation 
rate of 2,375 percent.141  This was the economic environment that 
contributed to the collapse of BANESPA and Nossa Caixa.  In 1994, 
Brazil introduced the Plano Real, an economic stabilization plan that 
                                                                                                                                                       
138 COMPANHIA DE SANEAMENTO BASICO DO ESTADO DE SAO PAULO-SABESP - 6-K - 20050919 - 
FORM, 64–65. 
139 Marques, Regulation of Water and Wastewater Services, 53. 
140 Mirandola, “Hybrid Capital Structures and the Governance of State-Owned Companies,” 35–41. 
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reasserted the federal government’s fiscal authority.  Failing Banks like 
Nossa Caixa and BANESPA were taken over by the federal government 
effectively ending the revolving door of disguised loans from state banks 
to state governments.  Additionally, the Plano Real also introduced a 
new currency called the ‘Real’.  Within two years Brazil’s inflation rate 
fell to an annual rate of 20 percent.142  The Plano Real helped to create 
a stable economic environment that allowed for SABESP to access 
foreign financial markets, attain lower rate loans, and establish long-
term construction contracts. 
With the Recovery Program and Brazil’s improve economy SABESP 
repaired its aging infrastructure, increased water processing capacity, 
and expanded service coverage.  By the end of 1995 water service 
coverage expanded from 84 percent to 91 percent.143  Since, SABESP 
has maintained nearly universal levels of water coverage- most recent 
95 percent in 2011.144 
 
SABESP Summary 
                                                 
142 Brazil, 230. 
143 Lobina and Hall, “Public Sector Alternatives to Water Supply and Sewerage Privatization,” 55. 
144 “IBNET Indicators.” 
 91 
 Under a military regime SABESP was focused on providing water 
to support industrialization.  However, Saõ Paulo growing economy 
attracted migrant’s seeking better jobs resulting in rapid population 
growth especially in the MRSP.  Population growth quickly outpaced 
infrastructure and service capability leaving the faveldos with poor water 
access.  The gradual democratization of Brazil was a driving factor in 
SABESP’s expansion of water coverage.  The onset of democracy gave 
civic movements more agency and in forcing SABESP to expand services 
into the faveledos.  However, rapid service expansion coupled with 
economic instability led to a decaying infrastructure with frequent 
service interruptions by the mid 1990’s.  SABESP was able to turn this 
around through a capital injection from the Brazilian government 
coupled with changes to its governance model and tariff structure.   
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 This final case study will focus on the Cooperativa de Servicios 
Públicos Santa Cruz (SAGUAPAC), a water and sewage utility serving the 
city of Santa Cruz de La Sierra, Bolivia.  Often literature reviews, water 
sector professionals, and international lenders (like the World Bank) cite 
SAGUAPAC as one of the best water and sanitation utilities in Latin 
America.  They note SAGUAPAC’s consistencies in maintaining full cost 
recovery, high levels of water coverage, low levels of non-revenue 
water, and strong performance in staff efficiency.  Such success is often 
credited to SAGUAPAC’s cooperative model.  A dominant narrative 
argues that the democratic nature of SAGUAPAC’s cooperative model 
shields the utility from external political influence and profit motive 
allowing the utility to be more consumers focused.145  Arguably, 
attributing SAGUAPAC’s success to its cooperative model is an 
oversimplification.  There are other factors that have contributed to 
SAGUAPAC’s success: 1) fractured water market; 2) wealthy service 
                                                 
145 Ruiz-Mier and van Ginneken, “Consumer Cooperatives.”; themes also found in Nickson 2000, 
Vasquez 2004, and Yavari, Birchall 2003 
 93 





 The water market in Santa Cruz de la Sierra can be considered 
geographically fragmented.  Water service is provided by SAGUAPAC 
plus seven additional smaller water cooperatives.  This fracture reflects 
a historical socio-economic divide between the city’s wealthier core and 
impoverished periphery.   
With over 1.6 million residents Santa Cruz de la Sierra is Bolivia’s 
most populous city.  Its urban area consists of nine concentric rings of 
neighborhoods that radiate out from the city’s colonial center.  Paved 
roads encircle each ring demarcating boundaries.  The four inner rings 
are locally referred to as the Casco Viejo.  They are the city’s original 
core and contain most of the affluent residents and profitable business; 
such as financial services, banking, insurance, advertising, and main 
offices for the department’s extractive industries.  Additionally, many of 
Bolivia’s multinationals are headquarter in the Casco Viejo146.   
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Established as the city’s first water and sewage utility in 1973, 
SAGUAPAC’s service area originally encompassed the Casco Viejo.  
Later, as the city expanded, SAUPAC’s service area encompassed parts 
of the 5th ring.  Today SAGUAPAC is the city’s largest water utility- 
providing water service to approximately 64 percent of the city’s 
population (1 million residents) with water coverage averaging between 
95 to 100 percent147.   
The remaining outer rings are locally referred to as the Mancha 
Urbana, which translates into ‘urban stain’.  The Mancha Urbana is 
characterized by high levels of poverty, illegal settlements, and lacks 
infrastructure development.  Much of its economy is characterized by 
informal work in domestic service, construction, transportation, and food 
service.148.  The remaining seven cooperatives operate in the city’s outer 
rings and provide water service to the remaining 36 percent of 
residents.  Compared to SAGUAPAC the periphery cooperatives are 
significantly smaller.  Listed in Table 9, the Cooperativa de Servicio 
Públicos Tres Mil (COOPLAN) is the city’s second largest cooperative 
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providing service to more than 147,000 residents with water coverage 
approximately 78 percent149.   
Table 11 Santa Cruz de La Sierra Water Coverage 




Cooperativa de Servicios Públicos Santa 
Cruz Ltda 
SAGUAPAC 999,582 100% 
Cooperativa de Servicios Públicos Plan 
Tres Mil 
COOPLAN 147,423 78.2% 
Cooperativa de Servicios Públicos 1° de 
Mayo Ltda 
COOPAGUAS 114,898 90.3% 
Cooperativa de Servicios Públicos Andrés 
Ibañez 
COSPAIL 67,472 92.3% 
Cooperativa de Servicios Públicos Pampa 
de la Isla 
COOPAPPI 54,587 89.0% 
Cooperativa de Servicios Públicos Los 
Chacos Ltda 
COSCHAL 17,064 79.0% 
Cooperativa de Servicios Públicos 
Humberto Leigue 
COSPHUL 15,465 96.9% 
Cooperativa de Servicios Públicos 
Limoncito 
COOPLIM 7,638 88.1% 
Source: Living without Sanitary Sewers in Latin America 
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 A criticism of SAGUAPAC is its failure to expand services beyond 
the Casco Viejo resulted in a fractured water market with high number 
of service providers150.  Discussed in the following, much of SAGUAPAC’s 
lack of expansion can be contributed to exponential population growth, 





In the 1950’s, Santa Cruz de la Sierra was an impoverished and 
isolated frontier town. There were no major arteries of transportation 
connecting the city to the rest of the country.  The city’s 42,000 
residents lacked paved roads, sufficient electricity, and telephone lines.  
Water services, if any, were primarily provided through private 
initiatives151.  By the end of the 1990’s Santa Cruz de la Sierra surpassed 
Bolivia’s capital La Paz as the country’s economic center.  Both the city 
and the Department of Santa Cruz account for 30 percent of Bolivia’s 
GDP and the city’s per capita income is 23 percent above the national 
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average.  A modernized agro-industry, a growing export sector, and a 
strong oil industry made Santa Cruz de la Sierra Bolivia’s most 
prosperous city152.   
Santa Cruz de la Sierra’s dramatic economic growth started in the 
1950’s and was fueled by resource rents from the department’s 
petroleum reserves and a public expenditure program called ‘March to 
the East’.  Launched in 1954, The March to the East aimed at offsetting 
Bolivia’s over-reliance on tin mining by developing the economies of 
Bolivia’s eastern departments.  A departmental government committee 
called the Comité de Obras Publicas or the Committee of Public Works 
(COP) served as the main institutional vehicle for financing ‘March to the 
East’ projects and played a primary role in shaping the city’s urban 
growth for decades153.  
In 1957, the COP contracted an Italian-Brazilian firm called 
Companía Técnia Internacional (Technit) to create urban development 
plans for Santa Cruz de la Sierra.  Techint’s plan was a modernization of 
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the city that envisioned a versatile urban space capable of expanding 
with rapid economic and population growth.  The plan structured the 
city into fourradio centric rings of urban living space that radiated out 
from the city’s colonial center.  The city’s structure resembled a target 
with the historical colonial center as the bulls-eye.  Unfortunately, 
Techint’s plan underestimated population growth.  Projections placed 
the city’s population at 500,000 by the end of the century.  In 2001, the 
city’s actual population was more than 1.1 million154.  Discussed below 








Source: Kirshner, “City Profile: Santa Cruz de la Sierra 
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During the 1950’s the Department of Santa Cruz’s economy 
transitioned from an antiquated plantation system to a large scale 
agribusiness.  By the 1960’s Santa Cruz de la Sierra was attracting 
international business and funding.  Better opportunities from the city’s 
economic growth coupled with the 1954 completion of the Cochabamba 
to Santa Cruz highway attracted new arrivals.  At first, the city’s new 
arrivals were mostly lowlanders migrating from rural parts of the eastern 
departments.  Starting in the late 1970’s new arrivals were migrating 
from the western departments and settling beyond the fourth ring.  By 
the 1980’s population growth outpaced anticipated urban plans.  City 
planners were unable to meet the basic needs of settlements in the 
outer rings155.  SAGUAPAC was established in 1973 as a department of 
the COP in the midst of Santa Cruz de la Sierra’s exponential population 
growth.  In 1973, the city’s water coverage was approximately 88 
percent.  However, do to the city’s population growth outpacing service 
expansion water coverage decreased to 78 percent in 1977.156  
Recognizing a need for an alternative water service model SAGUAPAC 
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separated from the COP in 1979 and was established as Bolivia’s first 
water-cooperative157.   
There are several reasons SAGUAPAC adopting a cooperative 
model.  First, there was familiarity with the cooperative utility model.  
Santa Cruz de la Sierra already had two utility cooperatives providing 
electricity and telephone services.  Both were popular with city residents 
and served as models.158  Second, a private model was not a viable 
option.  At the time Bolivia’s private sector was not large enough to 
generate/provide the necessary capital159.  Finally, there was a strong 
opposition by city residents to government ownership of local utilities160.  
Such opposition was largely due to resident’s strong sense of regional 
identity and self-reliance derived from a long history of the city’s 
geographical isolation and neglect by the central government.  Since 
Bolivia’s independence in the 19th century up until the 1950’s a majority 
of government spending and largesse went to the mineral rich western 
departments.  The eastern departments were largely ignored leading to 
pattern of uneven development between the two regions.  Since the 
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1950’s, Santa Cruz de la Sierra has been center of an aggressive 
regional autonomy movement that not only seeks more political control 
from the Bolivian government but economic control as well161.  This 
regional autonomy contextualizes the social fragmentation between the 
Casco Viejo and the Mancha Urbana.  The inner rings, mostly wealthy 
lowlanders, viewed the outer rings, predominately Andeans, as 
invaders.162  This fragmentation could also be another explanation for 
SAGUAPAC lack of service expansion.  Nickson notes a widely held view 
that SAGUAPAC’s lack of expansion is due to the ‘Toborochi’ a secret 
society of professional males belonging to traditional crucenos lowland 
families.163   
Despite being established in 1973, SAGUAPAC did not have a 
legally defined service area until 1997.  This was largely because of 
rapid urban growth and a weak water regulator.  First, the rapid 
expansion of the outer rings during the 80’s and 90’s outpaced the city’s 
government’s ability to define municipal boundaries. The city did not 
establish municipal jurisdictions until 1994.  Furthermore, the lack of 
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infrastructure development and urban planning in the outer rings 
discouraged service expansion164.  Second, until the late 90’s Bolivia had 
a weak water regulator.  Water and sewage oversight bounced between 
the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (MHUA) and the Ministry of 
Health.  There was very little oversight and no established service 
standards.  The lack of federal involvement is partially attributable to 
Bolivia’s 1906 Water Law (Ley de Aguas) which places municipalities in 
charge of water regulation and development.  Bolivia’s 1994 constitution 
changed the government’s role by establishing the state’s ownership of 
all water resources.  Water utilities would be required to get concession 
rights from the state.  In 1997, Bolivia’s first water and sewage 
regulator the Superintendencia de Saneamiento Básico (SISAB) was 
established.  SISAB granted SAGUAPAC a concession contract 
establishing operator’s right for 40 years165.   
 
Organizational Structure and Governance 
 
Often academic literature about SAGUAPAC will credit its success 
with its cooperative structure.  The utility’s democratic governance 
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impedes external political influence and profit motive allowing the utility 
to be consumer focused166.   
SAGUAPAC’s service area is divided into nine districts, each 
containing approximately 8,000 to 12,000 members.  Households and 
businesses connected to SAGUAPAC are members of the cooperative.  
New water service connections pay a one-time membership charge of a 
US$100 for a Certificate of Cooperation.  The certificate is place-based 
meaning that if a household is sold than membership is transferred with 
the property167.  Every two years members vote for three district 
representatives to serve in the Delegate Assembly.  Through the 27 
members Delegate Assembly cooperative member’s interest as 
consumers is represented.  Once the Delegate Assembly convenes 
representatives select six members to serve on the Oversight Board and 
nine members to serve on the Administrative Board.  The Oversight 
Board is responsible for ensuring SAGUAPAC compliance with accounting 
and legal norms and hires external auditors.  The Administrative Board 
is best identified as the link that connects the administration of 
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SAGUAPAC to the interest of cooperative members.  The Administrative 
Board defines SAGUAPAC’s policies, approves its budget, and hires and 
supervises the General Manager.  To minimize the influence of political 
parties on the Administrative delegate members who have been active 
in a political party in or have been a candidate in an election within the 
last five years are disqualified for service to the Administrative Board168.   
A critique of SAGUAPAC’s is that its cooperative structure creates 
challenges in raising capital for service expansion in both the private 
sector and government.  First, the not-for-profit nature of the 
cooperative model deters private investors.  Second, because 
SAGUAPAC’s political autonomy and its success it has few friends and 
advocates in government.  As a result SAGUAPAC is often passed over 
or ignored when lobbying for government investment funds169.   
 
Tariffs and Finance 
 
Despite limitations in raising capital SAGUAPAC has had success in 
maintaining full cost-recovery and the expansion of services.  This is 
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mostly attributed to its tariff, the wealth of its service area, and World 
Bank loans. 
SAGUAPAC’s tariff has a progressive structure that marginally 
increases service cost allowing high water users to subsidize low water 
users.  SAGUAPAC’s tariff is one of the highest in Latin America.  A 
significant portion of this is because of high delivery cost due to flat 
geography and low population density of its service area.170  SAGUAPAC 
claims that for a large part of its membership charges account for 4.5% 
of the average family income.171   
The March to the East initiative and revenue from petroleum sales 
significantly helped in expanding the city’s basic services and creating 
SAUGAPAC.  However, following SAGUAPAC’s establishment as a 
cooperative financing service expansion was challenged.  Financing from 
the central government was limited by a period of hyperinflation, 
brought on by political instability and over borrowing, lasting until 
1986172.  Financing from international private lenders was not an option 
either because, “private investors are not interested in lending to not-
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for-profit cooperatives”173.  With the help of two loans from the World 
Bank SAGUAPAC was able to expand water service to more than 
300,000 residents.   
In 1979, the World Bank approved a US$9 million dollar loan to 
SAGUAPAC for the expansion of water and sewage services.   At that 
time about 259,000 residents received water services and the city’s 
water coverage was approximately 86 percent.  The World Bank loan 
financed the expansion of SAGUAPAC’s water pumping and processing 
facilities plus the placement of 258 km of piping.  Additionally, a new 
sewage pumping station was built and 97 km of sewage lines were 
added.  SAGUAPAC’s water and sewage project was completed by 1987 
and expanded water service to an additional 128,000 residents and 
sewage service to 60,000 more.  Service expansion was completed in 
1987 and provided an additional 128,000 residents with water service 
and sewage service to another 60,000.  Despite the success of the first 
World Bank Loan the city’s overall water coverage decreased to 71 
percent in 1987.  The World Bank’s project completion report attributed 
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the persisting shortfall coverage decrease to the city’s high population 
growth and significant expansion of the outer rings.174  
In 1991, SAGAUPAC again received a World Bank Loan to expand 
water and sewage services and for institutional strengthening- 
improving management system and staff training.  The loan financed 
the expansion of water services to more than 225,000 residents and 
sewage service to 46,000 more.175  Both loans were considered a 
success by the World Bank.  The loans goals were achieved and 




As the city’s first water utility SAGUAPAC service area was 
established in the city’s inner rings.  However, population growth 
outpaced urban expansion and the city’s water market fractured.  The 
smaller water cooperative service the city’s impoverished periphery 
while SAGUAPAC’s service area encompasses the wealthy inner core.  
This wealth allows SAGUAPAC to maintain one of the highest tariff 
charges in Latin America.  Additionally, SAGUAPAC does not have to 
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deal with the challenges of poor infrastructure development found in the 
city’s periphery.   
As a water cooperative SAGUAPAC is frequently praised for its 
democratic structure, its transparency, and its insulation from profit 
motive and political corruption.  A consequence to the cooperative 
structure is the difficulty in obtaining financing for service expansion.   
SAGUAGPAC’s non-profit nature is discouraging to lending institutions.  
Additionally, SAGUAPAC’s political shielding does leave the utility with 
few friends and advocates in Bolivia’s government.  Despite this 
SAGUAPAC has been able to expand and strengthen its infrastructure 
thanks to its high tariff charges and several World Bank Loans.   
SAGUAPAC is an exemplary example of a well-functioning water 
utility capable of providing universal coverage to over 1 million users.  
Often this success is attributed to SAGUAPAC water cooperative 
structure.  However, success cannot be simply attributed to the 
cooperative model.  SAGUAPAC has benefited from the wealth of its 





 Water matters.  And who manages water utilities matter just as 
much.  There have been numerous example of contentious and 
sometimes violent protest resulting from ownership change.  In Buenos 
Aires, Argentina the privatization of their water utility resulted in 
pushback from the community after a tariff increase.  In São Paulo, 
Brazil SABESP’s decision to concentrate on providing businesses and 
industry water access while largely ignoring the favelas resulted in 
numerous protests.  This thesis sought to investigate the impact that 
management models of water utilities had on water coverage.   
 Two levels of analysis were used.  First, a statistical analysis of 
144 water utilities in 33 different countries was conducted.  Each of the 
144 utilities was categorized as private, public, or decentralized.  
Regression analysis was used to identify significance between each 
ownership model’s water coverage and efficiency.  Integrating with the 
data analysis a comparative case study of a privately owned water utility 
in Argentina, a publically owned water utility in Brazil, and a water 
cooperative in Bolivia was used to explore the impact of historical, 
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political, and economic factors that significantly impacted water 
coverage.   
Regression analysis showed that there is the possibility that at 
some level- management models can impact water coverage.  For 
publicly and privately owned water utilities, plugging leaks can translate 
into high rates of water coverage.  For decentralized water utilities high 
levels of unit operational cost can increase water coverage.  Regression 
analysis also shows that broad claims about ownership, efficiency, and 
improved water coverage should be suspect.  Not one ownership model 
established a satisfactory relationship between water coverage and all 
three independent variables.  However, the case studies showed that 
historical, political, economic, and institutions impact water coverage. 
In 1993, Buenos Aires public water utility was to the private water 
consortium Aguas Argentina (AASA).  Privatization was implemented 
with the goal of achieving universal water coverage through efficiency 
gains and full cost recovery.  However, a rushed privatization process 
neglected local historical, political, geographical, and economic factors 
all of which created unique challenges to service provision and 
expansion.  Furthermore, this rushed process created weak water 
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governance that failed to curtail AASA opportunistic behavior.  AASA 
continuously failed to meet performance targets, which lead to the 
renationalization of the utility in 2006. 
Established in 1973, SABESP was created through government 
development programs aimed at establishing and strengthening state 
owned water and sanitation companies.  SABESP was established during 
a period of exponential industrial growth and chaotic urbanization in São 
Paulo.  Themes of military rule, industrialization, and urbanization 
challenged SABESP’s ability to expand water services.  The gradual 
democratization of Brazil was a driving factor in SABESP’s expansion of 
water coverage.  The onset of democracy gave civic movements more 
agency in forcing SABESP to expand services into the faveledos.  
However, rapid service expansion coupled with economic instability led 
to a decaying infrastructure with frequent service interruptions by the 
mid 1990’s.  SABESP was able to turn this around through a capital 
injection from the Brazilian government coupled with changes to its 
governance model and tariff structure.   
Established in 1973, SAGUAPAC’s has grown to become one of the 
world’s largest water cooperatives.  SAGUAPAC is frequently praised for 
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its democratic structure, its transparency, and its insulation from profit 
motive and political corruption.  SAGAUPAC was challenged by the rapid 
growth of Santa Cruz de la Sierra.  Despite this SAGUAPAC has 
maintained near universal water coverage for its service area.  
Attributing SAGUAPAC success to it cooperative model is an 
oversimplification.  SAGUAPAC has also benefited from the wealth of its 
service area, loans from the World Bank, and high tariff charges.   
Do ownerships models alone impact water coverage through 
efficiency improvements?  Not really.  Statistical analysis could not 
establish a strong relationship between management models’ water 
coverage and water production, non-revenue, and unit operational 
costs.  Perhaps better segmentation of the case studies of management 
models could yield different results.  For example, instead of looking at 
all privatization models only look at concession contracts.  However, the 
case studies compliment this thesis’ statistical analysis.  In all three case 
studies management models alone could not explain successes or 
failures in water delivery.  For AASA the cultural concept of canilla libre 
coupled with Argentinian economic crisis significantly contributed to the 
utilities failure.  In Brazil, protests and democracy pushed SABESP to 
 113 
expand into the favelas.  Finally, SAGUAPAC’s success can be attributed 
to more than just its cooperative model- the wealth of the service area, 
World Bank loans, and high tariff charges.    
This thesis did expect to see decentralized management models 
performing the best.  However, statistical analysis coupled with case 
studies has concluded that this assumption is wrong.  A broad 
conclusion about management models cannot be drawn.  Success and 
failure are impacted by more nuanced historical, economic, political, 
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